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After a long period of nationalisation,France start-
ed to privatise state-owned firms in 1986. We will
first show why and how such a dramatic change
happened, then we will concentrate on the impact
of privatisation policies based on the cases provid-
ed by major firms.The next section reviews the pri-
vatisation status of major state-controlled enter-
prises. Then we study the performance of priva-
tised firms and summarise our findings with some
conclusions.
Privatisation in France – why and how
The peak of the privatisation policy can be found
during the period when the Socialist Party and
their allies ruled France from 1981 to 1986.At that
time, the total public sector represented 21 percent
of production, 23 percent of wages earners, 28 per-
cent of GDP, 30 percent of exports and 49 percent
of gross capital formation (Mamou 1996).
However, it soon became clear that this situation
could not go on forever for five major reasons:
1. Besides the theoretical critics of state ownership
of firms, basically resting on the theory of incen-
tives,the French state behaved as a weak and errat-
ic “shareholder”, hesitating between the maximisa-
tion of short-term financial or political benefits and
a “laissez-faire” approach allowing the state firms
to develop as they wished in spite of the bureau-
cratic control of their activities.1 Adverse effects of
poor state control can be felt by the firms them-
selves, by the state treasury as well by other French
investors.2 One radical way to solve the problem
was privatisation. Another was to better manage
state investments: the Ministry of Finance created
in 2003 a state agency, Agence des Participations de
l’Etat, to bring more consistency and vision to the
management of state holdings (Barbier de la Serre
2003; Minefi, 2003; Minefi 2004).
2.The co-existence of state-run and private compa-
nies (as in the car industry since 1945 or in the tele-
com industry more recently) is awkward and could
prevent nationalised companies from expanding
freely at home and abroad.
3.Even though they can boast an outstanding tech-
nical level, state monopolies suffered from time to
time from traditional problems like high prices,low
regard for customers, bureaucratic attitude (see
Giraud 1987 for a discussion within the field of
telecommunications).They also engaged in uncon-
trolled and costly expansion policies because of the
weakness of government control.
4. A major liberalisation and privatisation drive
started internationally in the 1980s and France fol-
lowed the trend. Even though European competi-
tion policy does not demand privatisation, it impos-
es severe restrictions on government intervention in
the economy (like state aids); at the same time,
deregulation policies (telecom, electricity, railways
etc.) permit other companies to enter the market –
private companies that nearly automatically com-
plain about the former state-owned monopoly lead-
ing to difficulties with the European Commission.
5.The size of the state budget deficit also provides
a permanent incentive to privatise state firms as
France has constantly experienced budget deficits
since 1981.
Despite all former initiatives to privatise, in 2003
there were still a huge number of state-controlled
enterprises:1,447 enterprises with 1.1 m employees
(in France) and a wage sum of 5.2 percent of total
wages in the economy. * Michel Berne,GET/INT,Département SGES (michel.berne@int-
evry.fr); Gérard Pogorel, GET/ENST, Département EGSH (ger-
ard.pogorel@enst.fr).The article is based on a previous work of the
authors (2004).
1 Several severe audits of state management of public firms can be
found, including a report of the National Assembly (Diefenbacher
2003).
2 In the case of a large, partly state-owned company listed on the
stock exchange, any poor performance will have two impacts : on
stock price indexes and on financing conditions.When a centre-right government was formed in
1986, it started dismantling the then enormous state
sector. It benefited from favourable conditions on
the Paris Bourse.The Socialists came back to power
in 1988 with a fragile majority in the National
Assembly. They enforced a policy that was then
dubbed “neither-neither” (ni-ni in French): no pri-
vatisation carried out by the previous government
was overturned, but no significant further privatisa-
tion was allowed. Since 1993, privatisation was the
norm and the succession of right and left govern-
ments has not really slowed the process (see Figure).
Since 2002, the centre-right government of Jean-
Pierre Raffarin has gone on privatising state-
owned companies with a very pragmatic approach:
• Selling when favourable conditions appeared (for
example, Crédit Lyonnais, sold over a week-end to
Crédit Agricole in 2003 after some hectic bidding),
• taking into account the long-term interests of
the companies (as in the Snecma-Sagem merger
in 2004), and even
• trying to “re-nationalise” companies in deep trou-
ble: (for example, to rescue Alstom, the troubled
electric and transportation equipment manufactur-
er in the summer of 2003, the
French government wanted to
buy 300 Me shares in Alstom.
But this plan was not approved
by the European authorities and
the government backed off).
The large number of firms sold
and their size can make privati-
sation a profitable operation for
the government. According to
(Minefi 2003), the gross privati-
sation income from 1986 to July
2003 amounted to e65.8 bn,
used in the following way:
• e9 bn to reduce the public debt (mostly
between 1986 and 1988);
• e1.6 bn allocated to a special pensions fund set
up to ease the impact of demographic changes
on the French pensions system;
• e50.5 bn allocated to the firms as equity injection;
• e4.7 bn for the regular state budget (in the
early 1990s).
As can be expected, different figures have be com-
puted by other sources, but we can safely conclude
that privatisation has had a positive impact on the
state budget (Mauduit 2002).
Impact of privatisation
Changes of ownership
Two very different cases can be distinguished
regarding changes in ownership. Some companies
were swiftly and totally privatised (the smaller
ones or the industrial firms nationalised in 1982),
but a large number of state-controlled companies
went through a very long and sometimes painful
privatisation process: after a partial IPO, the state
gradually sold additional chunks of shares until its
participation became nil or reduced to a “golden
share” (action spécifique). In a few extreme cases,
this last step has not yet been possible, either
because of legal problems or because of the poor
financial health of the company.
The legal framework includes three major acts dat-
ing back to 1986 (JO 1986a;JO1986b;JO 1993).For
the largest companies, a special privatisation act is
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Table 1 






Chirac Right 1986–88  13 
Balladur Right 1993–95  17 
Juppé Right 1995–97  9.4 
Jospin Left 1997–2002  31 
Note: More than 6 bn j was spent in 1983 on a ma-
jor nationalisation plan.
Source: Mauduit (2002) based on Baert (2000) and
Orange & Rocco (1999).CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 35
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needed to prepare the procedure. A government
decree is enough for smaller firms. A special sys-
tem was set up to allow entry and exit into and
from the state-owned sector for the many sub-
sidiaries owned by large state-owned firms. Since
1993, most of these subsidiaries as well as local
public services (sociétés d’économie mixtes locales)
can be sold under two simple declarative proce-
dures (Minefi 2004). From 1993 to 2003, 442 sales
of subsidiaries involving 210,781 employees were
performed.
The privatisation process of France Telecom
required three steps.The first one was the transfor-
mation of the PTT administration into two paras-
tatal entities – done by an act (JO 1990a) creating
La Poste and France Telecom.The unions were sat-
isfied by the guarantees offered that the personnel
would remain mostly public servants and that no
further significant change was planned. However
more changes were soon needed to cope with the
decision, taken in 1993 at the European level, to
have full competition in 1998 in the telecommunica-
tion sector leading to a second telecommunications
act which was passed in 1996 (JO1996a).
Another act was also adopted in 1996 transforming
the basically state-run entity France Telecom into a
quasi-standard private company (JO 1996b).
Moreover, in 1997, France Telecom paid e5.7 bn to
the state as a lump sum to be used to pay the extra
costs for the pensions of its retiring civil servants: the
government was happy to receive funds lowering the
budget deficit while France Telecom was happy to get
rid of a sizeable pension debt looming in the future.
The French government, pushed by the top manage-
ment of France Telecom,decided in 1995 to go for an
initial public offering (IPO) of the company. The
change of statute was mainly justified by the inter-
national ambitions of France Telecom, above all a
strategic alliance with Deutsche Telekom and Sprint.
After a long delay, the Initial Public Offering (IPO)
of France Telecom finally took place successfully in
1997 and netted e29 bn (Bertolus 2003, 35–70).The
state kept 75 percent of the capital; individual share-
holders got 10.55 percent of the capital. Financial
institutions obtained 11.95 percent and 70 percent of
the personnel of France Telecom bought 2.5 per-
cent. A second public offering took place in 1998
and netted e9 bn. Since then, the percentage of
France Telecom owned by the state has decreased in
several stages. As permitted by a 2003 act (Mer
2003; JO 2004a), the government sold 9.6 percent of
France Telecom and retained 42.2 percent in
September 2004.
A major problem blocking the privatisation of
France Telecom was the status of most of its staff
who were civil servants. After the IPO, France
Telecom stopped hiring civil servants and the
remaining ones were allowed to stay in the compa-
ny until their retirement.
Who owns the privatised firms ?
One major concern of the French government was
to keep control of the companies while selling their
capital, or at least to prevent the privatised compa-
nies from falling into foreign hands. During the
first privatisation phase, in 1986–88, the govern-
ment tried to set-up stable groups of investors (in
French Noyaux durs for “hard core”).This decision
generated a long controversy about the choice of
these friendly and stable investors (mostly banks).
The percentage of foreign ownership has neverthe-
less grown to very high levels for some companies.
In an extreme case, in 2003, the Canadian firm
Alcan has launched an offer for Pechiney – so the
later will no longer be under French management.
One can safely conclude that the globalisation of
business has dealt a fatal blow to any dreams of
national independence that might have inspired
French governments in the past.
Another impact was the creation of a large class of
small shareholders, tempted by the initial public
offering of blue-chip stocks (banks, large industrial
firms and France Telecom). The France Telecom
IPO generated a tremendous interest in the gener-
al public, who was severely affected by the incred-
ible rise and precipitous decline of the share price
in later years.The staff of privatised companies has
also consistently bought the shares reserved for
them by law (at very sweet prices).
Changes in competition
Privatisation has played a role in the increase of
competition in the French economy. In the network
industries, barriers to entry can be extremely high
for economic reasons – the so-called natural monop-
oly problem. Therefore, the privatisation of a state
monopoly will give various results depending on
barriers to entry and sector regulation, as shown bythe contrasted situation of air-
lines and telecommunications.
Until the arrival of low-cost com-
panies in the twenty-first century,
Air France has kept a strong grip
on the French market and all
moves to create a viable competi-
tor to the flag carrier have failed.
On the other hand, France
Telecom has steadily lost mar-
ket share to its competitors: at
the end of 2002, it held less than
50 percent of the mobile market
and 64 percent of the long- dis-
tance market. It has kept 81 percent of the local
telecommunications market, but the unbundling of
the local loop is progressing fast.
Privatisation status of state-controlled firms
At present state-owned firms can be found in four
major categories:
• Public services. Privatisation is following Euro-
pean Union deregulation policies, usually with
some delay.The case of EdF, the electricity pro-
ducer is discussed below. SNCF, the national
railways, is in poor financial condition and trade
unions are very powerful: no
IPO and privatisation plans
are possible.
• Defence and other strategic
industries. Privatisation or at
least a transformation of
state administrations into
standard companies is a must
to participate in the con-
struction of the new Europe-
an defence industry.As GIAT-
Industries, which produces
weapons and armoured vehi-
cles and has been a firm since
1990, is in bad shape, no fur-
ther move is possible. On the
contrary,DCN (Direction des
Constructions Navales, the
former Navy shipyards) was
transformed into a private
firm in 2003 and is presently
in good shape.
• TV and radio. Back in 1987,
the first state channel, TF1,
was privatised and sold to the Bouygues group.
France Télévision is the holding company man-
aging the remaining state TV channels, notably
France 2 and France 3.Even though rumours reg-
ularly surface as to the privatisation of one or
several of these channels,the government had no
official plans at the end of 2004.
• Miscellaneous firms: Charbonnages de France
(coal mines, closing down), Française des jeux
(lottery), toll highways etc.They are sold one by
one, when possible.
An interesting example of the difficulties of pri-
vatisation policies for public services is provided
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Table 2







Air France Airline 12.4 98 717,000
Areva Nuclear industry 8.3 473 491,000
DCN Shipyard (Navy) 1.9 24 140,000
EdF Electricity (utility) 44.9 935 1,697,000
France Télécom Telecommunications 46.1 3200 221,700
France Télévisions Television channels 2.4 49 7,000
GdF Natural gas 16.7 980 38,300
GIAT Army vehicles, weapons 0.7 –640 6,200
La Poste Postal services 18.0 205 314,100
SNCF Railways 22.5 66 243,900
SNECMA Aerospace 6.4 185 39,700
Source: Minefi (2004).
Table 3





Air France 18 SA Government share below 50% 
when Air France andKLM
merged (2004)
Areva 95 SA IPO planned, 2005
DCN 100 SA since 2003 Alliances being signed, IPO
possible after act is adopted
EdF 100 SA since 2004 IPO planned, 2005
GIAT 100 SA Evolution blocked due to poor
financial results




GdF 100 SA since 2004 IPO planned, 2005
La Poste 100 “Exploitant 
public”
Impacted by European de-
regulation
SNCF 100 EPIC No privatization plans
SNECMA 40 SA Merger with Sagem in 2004
Note: The normal legal status for large business firms in France is Société
Anonyme (SA). SNCF, is an EPIC. The legal form of La Poste is unique but it
is close to an EPIC.
Source: company information.CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 37
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by situation the national electricity producer EdF
found itself in at the end of 2004. European dereg-
ulation policy means that competition has arrived
on the French market. EdF would like to be in
good shape when competition becomes stronger:
ability to supply other energies, reform of its spe-
cific pension plan, job cuts. But it is prevented by
law from expanding outside of the electricity sec-
tor and the main trade union, CGT, has blocked a
change in the specific pension plans of EdF-GdF
employees in early 2003. So both the management
of the firm and the French government have
planned a change of statute and a slow move to
competition, a policy that would solve most of the
problems of EdF. Despite the opposition of CGT,
the change of statute was implemented by a law
voted in August 2004 (JO 2004b).
But EdF, as a former EPIC (see the box below), has
benefited from the financial guarantee from the
state, a clear advantage anytime it has to borrow
money. Also, in 2003 the European Commission
believed that EdF benefited from an undue competi-
tive advantage and it has declared its intention to ask
the operator to pay back to the state more than  1 bn
(mostly unpaid taxes, because of the EPIC statute).
Performance measures 
It is extremely difficult to give clear and objective per-
formance measures for French privatisation policies.
However, we will study three major areas for perfor-
mance:prices,productivity/cost structure and finance.
Prices
In this section, we will concentrate on prices for
public services. In competitive sectors, like cars,
banks etc., prices are market-oriented and price
controls are very limited. The situation is very dif-
ferent for public services like La Poste or EdF as
they have to have their tariffs approved by the rel-
evant ministries.
In the emblematic case of France Telecom again, the
retail prices decrease in general, and significant mar-
keting efforts take place (ART 2003; France Telecom
2003a). These moves follow a complex tariff “rebal-
ancing” strategy where local call prices and subscrip-
tion fees increase while long distance call price de-
crease, following a pan-European trend. Moreover,
France Telecom (as all other state companies) has to
have its main prices approved by the ministers in
charge of Telecommunications and the Economy,
after ART, the sector regulator, has presented a spe-
cific report. From 1997 to 2000, a minimum decrease
in prices had been imposed by the Ministry of
Economy (9 percent per year in 1997–98 and 4.5 per-
cent per year in 1999–2000; these figures apply to a
selected basket of basic services). ART is especially
careful about predatory pricing by France Telecom.
Thus France Telecom is walking a tightrope: if its
prices are too high, it will lose market share; if its
prices are too low, they will not be approved.
Productivity and cost structure
Privatisation introduces changes in cost structures
for a number of reasons:
1. Starting and stopping activities is easier. Inter-
national expansion is also easier.
2. There is also more flexibility as regards human
resources management in all its components: hir-
ing, compensation, promotion;
3. After privatisation, specific tax systems disap-
pear (usually leading to higher taxes).For example,
France Telecom has declared its 1997 IPO cost the
company more than 300 million euros in addition-
al taxes in France (mostly local taxes, excluding
income tax) that year.
When we look at the figures of France Telecom in
France, the number of employees decreased from
160,700 to 141,100 between 1996 and 2002. In 1997,
each employee of France Telecom in France was
responsible for 207 main lines and 10 mobile lines.
In 2002, (s)he was responsible for 241 fixed lines,
plus 136 mobile lines and 28 internet customers.
Privatisation is only one possible cause of this
increase in labour productivity, the two main fac-
EPIC
An EPIC (Etablissement public à caractère
industriel ou commercial) is a state entity with
mixed features. On one side, it belongs to the
state system: its mission is defined by law and
cannot be easily extended; it cannot default
financially as it benefits from state backing; it
does not always pay taxes like a normal compa-
ny;it has a Board nominated by the state and all
its main decisions have to be approved a poste-
riori. On the other hand, it conducts quasi-nor-
mal commercial operations, can enter partner-
ships and own subsidiaries. Variations exist in
the actual statute of the many EPICs found in
France. (Minefi 1991).tors being the development of new services (like
mobile phones) and the age structure: Starting in
1996, a large number of older employees retired,
with additional incentives being provided for early
retirement for civil servants (22,000 early retirees
between 1996 and 2002). Since 1992, various
reforms have also increased the flexibility of work-
force use. For example, in 2002, 9,500 employees
have been retrained and mostly transferred to cus-
tomer relations, information systems and multime-
dia (France Telecom 2003a; France Telecom
2003b). Full privatisation should make these
changes easier to implement, but they are feared
by trade unions.
Finally, privatisation made it easier to give addi-
tional compensation to the top management of
France Telecom and to offer them stock options.
Innovation
French public services have long had a reputation
for innovation and technical prowess.3 All these
innovations were possible because tariffs were set
by the state and were based on large-scale cross-
subsidies between services, at least during the
launch of the new services or production tools.
European regulation, as it opens public services to
competition, prohibits cross-subsidies from regu-
lated to unregulated activities as detrimental to
competition. Moreover, the state had a long-term
view of technical innovation and financial perfor-
mance so that pay-back periods could be long. In
privatised firms, the private shareholders are more
impatient about financial rewards, less enthusiastic
about technical innovation (Munari 2002) and
unable to deal with social and political controver-
sies (as EdF with nuclear energy,dealing with envi-
ronmental issues).
The case of France Telecom, again, provides interest-
ing insight. France embarked in the 1970s and 1980s
on developing several innovative technologies (digi-
tal switching, videotex [Berne 1997], cable televi-
sion). Most of these innovations came from the
renowned research centre, CNET, (Centre National
d’Etudes des Télécommunications), founded in 1944
as a national research institution dealing with funda-
mental research coupled to a traditional operator
R&D centre. Following the IPO of France Telecom,
CNET, renamed France Telecom R&D and com-
pletely refocused on internal needs, mainly for the
development of new services (France Telecom
2003a). Costs figures for R&D show a steep decline
as a percentage of sales after the IPO. In 2003, the
percentage of sales devoted to R&D is up again.
Finance
Financial indicators, like profits, debt ratios and
stock prices provide another set of measures of per-
formance but methodological reasons could flaw
the results. For example, the financial health of the
public sector was poor in 2002/03, but now that the
government has privatised nearly all the profitable
companies, it is mostly stuck with the unprofitable
ones (Minefi 2003). One very positive impact of the
privatisation process is that it forces the govern-
ment to make the firms profitable (debt reduction,
fresh capital, restructuring). Thomson, Air France,
Usinor, Crédit Lyonnais have all gone through very
difficult times: yet, after some painful years, it was
possible to privatise them as soon as they were in
good shape and since then (at least until 2004) most
of them have developed normally.4
Again, the case of France Telecom is interesting.
After its IPO, France Telecom expanded very fast,
particularly abroad and in new sectors (mobile,
internet,television).When it bought Orange in 2000
at a price of h43.2 bn as well as several UMTS5
licenses, most of these purchases were paid in cash:
issuing new stock would have lowered the share of
the state below 50 percent, a move then forbidden
by law. France Telecom had to borrow massively for
this purchase. Even though overall operational
results were quite acceptable at group level,some of
these purchases failed to produce financial returns,
and servicing the debt was nearly impossible.A res-
cue plan devised in 2002 called for h15 bn of fresh
money, a debt refinancing of h15 bn and h15 bn in
savings.
As regards stock prices, the introduction price for
France Telecom shares was h24.03 and after one
trading day it was up to h31.5; the share peaked at
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3 To name a few examples, EdF has conducted an outstanding pro-
gram in nuclear energy; rail transport has been transformed by the
introduction of the TGV high speed train by SNCF and Air France
has,jointly with British Airways,operated the supersonic Concorde
plane.
4 Out of the 1000 largest firms in the world (listed by Business
Week according to market value in May 2004), 44 firms were
French. There were 23 privatised firms on the list. Amongst them,
with their world rank: Total (23), France Telecom (64), BNP (71),
Vivendi (170), Alcatel (276), Saint-Gobain (303), Autoroutes du
Sud de la France (626),TF1 (813), etc. (Business Week 2004).
5 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System,the European ver-
sion of the third mobile generation.CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 39
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h219 on 2 March 2000, then fell to an all-time low
of  6.94 on 30 September 2002.In January 2005 the
price was around h23.
Conclusions 
The changing role of ideology
The privatisation process in France has been heavi-
ly loaded in terms of ideology as has the case for
nationalisation itself.The reluctance to privatise has
been especially high due to the combination of
three political ideologies. The Socialist ideology
states that “people” or state-ownership are in all
cases superior to private ownership.The “Dirigiste”
(Colbertiste, Bonapartist, and Gaullist) tradition,
highlights the superior knowledge and vision of the
state. A Christian inspired Social Doctrine advo-
cates public property in the name of the public good
and social solidarity.
This combination resulted not only in the above-
mentioned nationalisation, but in provisions for
“public ownership” to be included in the 1946 con-
stitution when the government coalition was com-
posed of those three political forces.Until the early
1980s, this combination had remained prevalent in
terms of popular support. The radical changeover
in ideology and reality in the United States and the
United Kingdom began to induce, but with some
delay, changes in French political doctrines. It,
combined with the disastrous economic situation
which followed the phase of nationalisations car-
ried out by the “Union of the Left”coalition (1981-
1986),paved the way for the protracted and not yet
finalised privatisation process.
Perception of privatisation policies
Privatisations are now a widely accepted in princi-
ple. However, trade unions and social forces often
fight successfully to oppose them in order to pre-
serve special workers and social conditions in the
public sector. It often takes imperious “strategic”
moves, as in the Air France KLM merger case, to
assuage this reluctance.
It has to be said that the reluctance demonstrated
recently by this blue-ribbon, global corporation to
comply with the governance and information
transparency rules they preach has not helped in
promoting the image of private corporations.
Lessons to be learned?
The implementation of sound governance rules for
the private sector seems to have to go hand in hand
with the promotion of the privatisation process.
Succeeding French governments have learned the
hard way that privatisation is a slow process and
that one should pay as much attention to corporate
governance of partially privatised firms as to pri-
vatisation moves. As an example, the IPO of
France Telecom was a resounding success in 1997;
the results of the company were disastrous in 2001
and 2002 – not only because of the burst of the
telecom bubble. Another sad example is provided
by the computer manufacturer Bull: the state has
been unable to revitalize the firm, despite massive
injections of public money (much disliked by the
European Commission, as to be expected).
Reaction to EU directives
EU directives have played a very important role in
the evolution of economic ideologies and realities. In
many cases, French governments have taken advan-
tage of them to promote internal policies they actual-
ly supported without daring saying so. We know no
directive can be taken without the explicit agreement
of member countries Governments. “Brussels con-
straining demands”, however, have often been
invoked by French governments as forcing them to
take not-so-popular or unpopular measures and deci-
sions. It is a well established principle that European
policy is neutral as regards the ownership of firms.
However, European policy promotes competition in
most sectors. These changes have a deep impact on
state firms. Actually, they cannot survive in the new,
deregulated, environment without drastic changes.
Probably, privatisation is the only way for them to
meet the challenges of deregulation. After France
Telecom and Air France, the government has decided
on IPOs for both EdF and GdF.After France Telecom
again, EdF will be a testing ground for the success of
the privatisation process: it is a well-run company,
renders vital services, employs sensitive technologies,
makes huge long-term investments,and is,at the same
time, under deregulation constraints.
References
ART (2003), Rapport public d’activité,Autorité de Régulation des
Télécommunications 9, Paris.
Baert D (2000),Comptes spéciaux du Trésor et entreprises publiques,
Annexe N° 43, Rapport sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2001,
Assemblée nationale, October, Paris.Barbier de la Serre (2003), L’Etat actionnaire et le gouvernement des
entreprises publiques, Ministère de l’Economie, des finances et de
l’industrie, 24 February, Paris.
Berne M. (1997), “French Lessons: The Minitel Case”, in H.
Kubicek,W.H. Dutton and R.Williams, eds., The Social Shaping of
Information Superhighways, Saint Martin’s Press, NY.
Berne, M. and G. Pogorel (2004), “Privatization Experiences in
France”, Cesifo Working Paper No. 1195.
Bertolus J. J., J. M. Cedro and T. Del Jesus (2003); “Qui a ruiné
France Telecom?” Hachette, 35–70.
Borde D. and M. C. Dang-Tran (1997),“Legal aspects of the French
privatization program: review of the Pechiney privatization as a
practical case”, Journal of International Affairs 50 (2), 519–29.
Bureau D. (1997), La gestion des entreprises publiques, Document
de travail N° 97–5, Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’in-
dustrie, Paris.
Business Week (2004), “The Global 1000”, Business Week, New
York, 26 July.
Chabanas N.and E. Vergeau (1996), Nationalisations et privatisa-
tions depuis 50 ans, INSEE Première 440, Paris.
Cohen E. (1992), Le colbertisme “high-tech”, Pluriel, Paris.
Conseil d’Etat (1993),Avis n° 355 255 du 18 novembre 1993,Conseil
d’Etat; Paris.
Conseil d’Etat (2002), Rapport public 2001, Les autorités adminis-
tratives indépendantes, Conseil d’Etat; Paris.
Diefenbacher M.(2003),Rapport de la Commission d’enquête sur la
gestion des entreprises publiques afin d’améliorer le système de prise
de décision (Commission “Douste-Blazy”), Assemblée nationale,
July, Paris.
Ducourtieux C.(2003),“La Frances’ouvre de plus en plus aux fonds
anglo-saxons”, Le Monde, Paris: 29 July 2003.
Durant R.F. and J.S. Legge (2002), “Politics, Public Opinion and
Privatization in France: Assessing the Calculus of Consent for
Market Reforms, Public administration review 62(3), 307–23.
Figaro (2003),“Le grand bal des privatisations continue d’animer le
marché”, Le Figaro, 20 November.
Flores N. (1994), “Steady Does It : Balladur Reforms the French
Economy”, Harvard International Review 16(3).
France Telecom (2003a), Rapport d’activité, Paris.
France Telecom (2003b), Bilan social 2002, Paris.
Giraud C. (1987), Bureaucratie et changement. Le cas de l’adminis-
tration des télécommunications, L’Harmattan, Paris.
INSEE (1999), Tableaux de l’économie française 1999–2000, Paris.
JO (1986a) Loi n° 86-912 du 6 août 1986 (dite Loi de privatisation),
Journal Officiel de la République Française, Paris.
JO (1986b), Loi n° 86-793 du 2 juillet 1986, Journal Officiel de la
République Française, Paris.
JO (1989), Loi n°89-465 du 10 juillet 1989 (dite Loi de “dénoyau-
tage”), Journal Officiel de la République Française, Paris.
JO (1990a), Loi n° 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 relative à l’organisation
du service public de la poste et des télécommunications, Journal
Officiel de la République Française 157, 8 July.
JO (1990b) Loi n° 90-1170 sur la réglementation des télécommuni-
cations, Journal Officiel de la République Française 303, Paris.
JO (1993), Loi n° 93-923 du 19 juillet 1993 dite “Loi de privatisa-
tion”, Journal Officiel de la République Française 166, 21 July.
JO (1996a), Loi n° 96-659 du 26 juillet 1996 de réglementation des
télécommunications, Journal Officiel de la République Française
174, 27 July.
JO (1996b) Loi n° 96-660 du 26 juillet 1996 relative à l’entreprise
nationale France Télécom, Journal Officiel de la République
Française 174, 27 July.
JO (2004a), Loi n° 2003-1365 du 31 décembre 2003 relative aux
obligations de service public des télécommunications et à France
Télécom, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1 January.
JO (2004b), Loi n° 2004-803 relative au service public de l’électric-
ité et du gaz et aux entreprises électriques et gazières, Journal
Officiel de la République Française, 11 August.
Le Cœur P.and G.Macke,France Telecom:les députés autorisent le
gouvernement à engager “la privatisation”,Le Monde,7 December.
Loiseau H. (2002), 1985–2000 : Quinze années de mutation du
secteur public d’entreprises, INSEE Première no. 860, juillet.
Mamou Y. (1996), “La saga des privatisations”, Le Monde, 19 No-
vember.
Mauduit L. (2002), “En France les privatisations ont rapporté 70
milliards d’euros”, Le Monde, 9 April.
Mer F.(2003),“Projet de loi relatif aux obligations de service public
des télécommunications et à France Télécom”, http:www.senat.fr/
dossierleg/pjl02-421.html>.
Minefi (1991), “Les grands principes de l’EPN”, hppt://www.
finances.gouv.fr/reglementation/instructions_comptables/M91>.
Minefi (2003), L’Etat actionnaire, Rapport 2003, Projet de loi de
finances pour 2004, Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’in-
dustrie, Paris.
Minefi (2004) L’Etat actionnaire, Rapport 2004, Projet de loi de
finances pour 2005, Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’in-
dustrie, Paris.
Munari F. (2002), “The effects of privatization on corporate R&D
units : Evidence from Italy and France” R&D Management 32 (3),
223–32.
Orange M.and A.M.Rocco (1999),“Nationalisations-privatisations:
l’Etat gagnant”, Le Monde, 17 juillet 1999.
Tribune (2003), Dossier spécial privatisations, La Tribune de l’é-
conomie, 15 to 19 September 2003.
CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 40
Forum